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5
CASENOTES
Avoiding the Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Context of Occupational
Safety and Health; The Requirement of Significant Risk; Industrial Union
Department AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute' — In 1970 Congress
passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) 2 in response to
what was considered to be a lack of adequate protection for American workers
from hazards in their work environments.' The OSH Act created the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a federal agency charged
with the responsibility of carrying out the daily administration of the Act. The
authority to establish OSHA standards regulating conditions in the work en-
vironment, however, was granted to the Secretary of Labor. 4 There are three
types of OSHA standards: interim standards,' permanent standards 6 and
emergency temporary standards,' each to be adopted by separate procedures
' 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980).
29 U.S:C. 5 651-78 (1976).
The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee noted that, at the time of the Act's
passage, state-imposed.safety standards varied greatly, often offering little protection. "No one
has seriously disputed that only a relatively few states have modern laws relating to occupational
health and safety and have devoted adequate resources to their administration and
enforcement." S. REP. NO. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE
CONG & AD. NEWS 5177, 5180.
In 1970, for instance, it was estimated that unsafe conditions in the workplace were caus-
ing an average of 14,500 deaths and over 2 million disabilities each year. Id. at 2, [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5178. In addition recent studies had uncovered a number of
previously unknown dangers from toxic materials, excessive noise levels, and harmful physical
agents, all routinely encountered by workers. Id. Because of this situation, Congress designed the
Act to provide, to the extent possible, that every employee would have a safe and healthful work
environment. As the statute itself states: "The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy
. . to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful
working conditions. . . . " S 2(b) of The Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 651(6) (1976).
4 29 U.S.C. 5 655 (1976).
• Interim standards were the mechanism by which the Act was to be brought into effect
as soon as possible after its passage. The OSH Act directed the Secretary to choose from among
the then-existing national health standards the one which assures the greatest protection to
workers and to adopt it as an OSHA standard. 29 U.S.C. 5 655(a) (1976).
• The procedure for establishing permanent standards is more complex. The
Secretary, after determining that a standard should be issued, publishes a proposed rule in the
Federal Register. Interested parties are then allowed to file written comments or objections to the
proposal and to request a hearing. The Secretary may then grant this request, but he is not re-
quired by the OSH Act to hold a formal hearing at which a record for review is generated. 29
U.S.C. S 655(6) (1976). Where a hearing is granted, the Secretary has chosen to add a limited
right of cross-examination to facilitate the creation of an evidentiary record suitable for review
under the substantial evidence standard established in the OSH Act. 29 C.F.R. 5 1911.15
(1980). After an opportunity for comments or hearing has occurred the Secretary may adopt or
amend the proposed standard before it finally is issued. 29 U.S.C. S 655(b) (1976).
• Emergency temporary standards take effect immediately following publication in the
Federal Register. The Act limits the use of such standards, however, to instances where the
Secretary determines that employees are exposed to a grave danger and that an emergency tem-
porary standard is necessary to protect workers from this danger. 29 U.S.C. 5 655(c) (1976). In
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set forth in the Act. The Department of Labor is the primary enforcer of these
standards. 8 Preenforcement review of OSHA standards is available in the
United States courts of appeal. 9 The Act explicitly provides that the determina-
tions made by the Secretary in establishing a standard shall be upheld if they
are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole.
Following the passage of the OSH Act, the federal government became ac-
tively involved in the regulation of employee exposure to benzene, a toxic
substance produced mostly by the petrochemical industry." It has long been
recognized that exposure to benzene can be a health hazard causing a wide
variety of nonmalignant diseases' 2 and prior to the passage of the OSH Act
some states had set maximum worker exposure levels." In 1971, the Secretary
of Labor, acting pursuant to his authority under the OSH Act, adopted an in-
terim, standard' 4 setting the maximum benzene exposure rate averaged over an
eight hour work day at 10 parts per million (ppm)."
Throughout the 1970's, a number of medical studies were published that
indicated a strong connection between benzene exposure and cancer.' 6 Ap-
parently acting in response to this additional information," the Secretary of
Labor issued a proposed permanent standard in 1977 that would have lowered
the permissible benzene exposure level from 10 ppm to 1 ppm.' 8 At that time,
OSHA requested comments from interested parties on various aspects of the
several cases the lower courts have invalidated OSHA emergency temporary standards because
the Secretary failed to demonstrate that the danger was grave and that emergency measures were
necessary. See, e.g., Florida Peach Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 132 (5th
Cir. 1974); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1973).
29 U.S.C. 655 (1976).
9 29 U.S.C. S 655(f) (1976).
1 ° This standard of review is something of a hybrid since it applies the substantial
evidence test, usually reserved for on-the-record rulemaking, to findings that may be made after
an informal quasi-legislative proceeding.
" 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978).
12 Indus. Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 100 S.Ct. 2844, 2851-52
(1980).
15 Id. Massachusetts, for example, set a maximum employee exposure level at 35 parts
per million (ppm). Id.
H See note 5 supra.
43 Fed. Reg. 5919 (1978). Section 6(a) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. S 655(a) (1976)
authorized the Secretary of Labor, during the first two years following the Act's effective date, to
adopt as an interim standard one of the existing national consensus standards. In this case, the
Secretary chose the standard approved by the American National Standards Institute. In addi-
tion to the 10 ppm requirement, the standard adopted by OSHA limited short-term exposure to
25 ppm for ten-minute periods or a maximum peak exposure of 50 ppm. 43 Fed. Reg. 5919
(1978).
16 100 S.Ct. at 2852.
17 In its reports to OSHA, the National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety
(NIOSH) had indicated that the benzene standard should be set as low as possible. In a report
issued just prior to the Secretary's decision to lower the standard, NIOSH had erroneously sug-
gested that exposure levels between zero and 15 ppm had caused a five times greater number of
cases of leukemia in certain workplaces studied over a nine-year period. Id. at 2854, 2854 n.16.
18 The proposed standard also lowered short-term exposure from 25 ppm to 5 ppm for
any ten-minute period and eliminated the permissible maximum peak exposure level of 50 ppm.
42 Fed. Reg. at 22517 (1977).
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standard and its likely impact.' 9
 After holding informal hearings and receiving
evidence, OSHA issued the new benzene standard on February 10, 1978. 20
In American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA parties representing industrial pro-
ducers and users of benzene brought suit in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
challenging the validity of the new benzene standard. 2 ' They contended that
the standard did not conform to the definition of an OSHA standard found in
section 3(8) of the OSH Act, which requires that OSHA standards be
"reasonably necessary or appropriate. "22 In their view, a standard could not
be reasonably necessary or appropriate unless its benefits were shown to be
greater than its cost to the affected industry." Bolstering this argument, the
challengers also contended that section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act, which requires
the Secretary of Labor to set, for toxic substances, standards which protect
employees "to the extent feasible," 24 also required cost-benefit analysis to
determine whether a standard is feasible." Since the Secretary of Labor had
not done a cost-benefit analysis of the benzene standard, they argued that
OSHA had failed to meet its statutory obligations and that the standard was,
therefore, invalid. 26
OSHA denied that the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate" im-
posed an obligation on the agency to weigh the costs and benefits of its stand-
ards.” In addition OSHA argued that the benzene standard was "feasible"
because it was achievable without causing serious economic dislocation in the
affected industries." Thus, OSHA denied that either section 3(8) or section
6(b)(5) of the OSH Act required cost-benefit analysis of its standards.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, with OSHA's
position. Reading the OSH Act's "reasonably necessary or appropriate"
language in conjunction with its requirement that standards be "feasible," the
court in American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA held that the Secretary of Labor is
required to quantify the costs and benefits of a proposed standard and to find
L9 42 Fed. Reg. at 27452 (1977).
20 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978). In its final form the benzene standard also banned all ex-
posure to liquids containing more than .5% benzene. Id.
21 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
22 Id. at 500. This language is found in the definition of an OSHA standard which reads
as follows: "[t]he term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which re-
quires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations,
or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment." (emphasis added) 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
23 581 F.2d at 501.
24 The first sentence of § 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act reads in part:
The Secretary . . shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee
has regular exposure to the hazard . . . for the period of his working life.
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
25 581 F.2d at 501.
26 Id.
27 Id.
26 Id. at 503.
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that they are reasonably related, before he is empowered to adopt the proposal
as an OSHA standard." Because the Secretary had failed to quantify and
weigh the costs and benefits of the benzene standard in this manner, the court
held that the standard was invalid. 30 The court not only endorsed the view that
cost-benefit analysis is required by the OSH Act, but by requiring costs and
benefits to be quantified, it also raised serious doubts concerning the
Secretary's authority to set any OSHA standard when, even with the best
scientific techniques, these variables could only be estimated in a general way.
Upon a petition by the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO,
brought on behalf of its workers in the affected industries, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 3 ' In a 5-4 decision, the Court, in Industrial Union Department
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute," affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals and held: (1) that the OSH Act requires the Secretary of Labor to find
that the proposed 1 ppm benzene standard is reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate to protect employees against a significant risk of material health im-
pairment before he is empowered to adopt it as an OSHA standard, and (2)
that because the Secretary had failed to make this necessary threshold finding
the benzene standard was invalid. 34 By invalidating the benzene standard on
these grounds the Court managed to avoid deciding the question whether the
OSH Act requires the Secretary to do a cost-benefit analysis of proposed stand-
ards for toxic substances.
The decision of the Court was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Stewart. 35 Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist each
wrote concurring opinions, with Powell concurring only in part and Rehnquist
agreeing solely with the Court's judgment. 36 Justice Marshall wrote a dissent-
ing opinion in which he was joined by Justices Brennan, White and
Blackmun." Since the majority was far from unanimous in its views, these
divisions in the Court are particularly important in evaluating the likely impact
of the case.
The Court's decision in Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute is significant, not only because it invalidated OSHA's
29 Id. at 504.
3° Id. at 505. The court focused on the lack of findings regarding the likely benefits of
the benzene standard and concluded:
OSHA's failure to provide an estimate of expected benefits for reducing the
permissible exposure limit, supported by substantial evidence, makes it impossible
to assess the reasonableness of the relationship between expected costs and
benefits. This failure means that the required support is lacking to show
reasonable necessity for the standard promulgated.
Id.
31 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
32 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980).
33 Id. at 2850.
34 Id. at 2873.
" Id. at 2849.
26 Id. at 2874 (Burger, C.J. concurring); Id. at 2875 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at
2878 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
97 Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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benzene standard, but also because it was the Court's first attempt to resolve
the controversy over whether the Occupational Health and Safety Act requires
cost-benefit analysis of OSHA standards. Although the Court did not decide
whether cost-benefit analysis is necessary," the various opinions provide some
indication as to how the Court ultimately will decide this hotly debated issue.
OSHA's critics have repeatedly called for an end to what they consider to be
OSHA's tendency to over-regulate in instances where the benefits of a stand-
ard are meager or where the likelihood of harm is remote. These critics argue
that such regulations actually contravene the basic purpose of the OSH Act by
seriously misallocating industry resources available for health and safety,
thereby reducing the overall degree of safety that can be achieved." According-
ly, they contend that the provisions in the OSH Act that state that OSHA stand-
ards set by the Secretary of Labor must be "reasonably necessary or appropri-
ate"" and must prevent material impairment of health "to the extent
feasible" 4 ' should be read as requiring the Secretary to rely on cost-benefit
analyses in setting OSHA standards.
OSHA has vigorously opposed the imposition of a cost-benefit require-
ment. It has argued that the impossibility of putting a value on human life
makes the cost-benefit approach impractical in the health and safety context.* 2
OSHA has further contended that the OSH Act's emphasis on achieving the
greatest degree of safety leaves no room for consideration of the cost-
effectiveness of its standards.'" Consistent with this view, OSHA has contend-
ed that the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language of section 3(8)
does not restrict the Secretary's authority to set standards that reasonably can
be expected to improve worker safety.** OSHA has argued that a standard is
"feasible" for purposes of section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act if it is achievable
without widespread harm to the viability of the affected industries.'"
The multitude of opinions in Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO u.
American Petroleum Institute is indicative of the differences that exist among the
38 Id. at 2863. At the same time, the plurality made it dear that the cost-benefit issue
may be addressed directly in a future case. "Because the Secretary did not make the required
threshold finding in this case, we have no occasion to determine whether costs must be weighed
against benefits in an appropriate case." Id.
39
 This argument is clearly stated in the American Petroleum Institute's Supreme
Court brief:
Nothing could frustrate the purpose of the OSH Act more completely than to have
a grave or extraordinarily dangerous hazard go unregulated because the affected
industry had already been driven to the limits of survival by the costs of controlling
a far less serious risk addressed in a previous regulation.
Brief for Respondent at 32, Indus. Union Dept. AFL-CIO u. Am, Petroleum Inst., 100 S.Ct. 2844
(1980).
4° Section 3(8) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 652(8) (1976). See note 22 supra.
" Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 655(b)(5) (1976). See note 24 supra.
42 Brief for the Federal Parties at 62 n.52, Indus. Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980).
43 Id. at 48.
44 Id. at 46.
45 Id. at 56-59.
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justices on this issue. At the same time, a majority of the justices either opposed
or refused to consider whether the Act required a cost-benefit approach." The
plurality position, which requires the Secretary of Labor to find a significant
risk before proposing an OSHA standard, indicates that the Court is searching
for an effective way to clarify the limits of the Secretary's authority to set stand-
ards without resorting to the cost-benefit approach.
This casenote will analyze whether the requirement of significant risk,
adopted by the Court in Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute, is a more appropriate means of defining the authority to set
OSHA standards for toxic substances than a cost-benefit approach, in light of
the language and purpose of the OSH Act. After briefly describing the origin
and purpose of the OSH Act, this casenote will examine the case law and
legislative history regarding those provisions of the Act that are the focus of the
Court's decision in this case. This discussion will be followed by a thorough
review of the opinions and the standard of review each justice would apply.
Next, the probable impact of the plurality approach will be appraised. Finally,
it will be proposed that the requirement of significant risk can be used to clarify
the limits of the Secretary of Labor's 'standard setting authority in a manner
that is more workable and consistent with the OSH Act's purposes than a cost-
benefit approach.
I. THE LIMITS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S AUTHORITY TO
SET OSHA STANDARDS FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES
The threshold requirement of significant risk is derived by reading sec-
tions 3(8) and 6(b)(5) together, so that an OSHA standard is not valid unless it
fits within the general definitional language of section 3(8) and is adopted in the
manner prescribed by section 6(b)(5). It is essential to understand how these
provisions operate separately before it is possible to determine how they inter-
relate within the framework of the OSH Act. For this reason, the following sec-
tions will examine the language, legislative history and pertinent case law
regarding each of these provisions to explain how each was construed prior to
Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute.
A. The Definitions of an OSHA Standard: Construing Section 3(8)
The two provisions of the Act that are central to the Court's decision in
this case are sections 3(8), 47 the general definition of an occupational health
and safety standard, and section 6(b)(5), 48 which governs the Secretary's con-
46 Six of the justices addressed this issue. The four dissenters opposed the use of cost-
benefit analysis where the costs did not pose a threat to the industry. 100 S.Ct. at 2903; see text
and notes at notes 167-75 infra. Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Act provided insufficient
detail as to how costs and benefits should be weighed. Id. at 2885; see text and notes at notes
159-65 infra. Only justice Powell endorsed the cost-benefit approach. Id. at 2877-78; see text and
notes at notes 156-58 infra.
47 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). See note 22 supra.
48 29 U.S.C. $ 655(b)(5) (1976). See note 24 supra.
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duct in selecting permanent standards for toxic substances. In section 3(8), the
Act defines an OSHA standard as a standard that requires conditions or prac-
tices which are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or
healthful employment or places of employment." Before Industrial Union
Department AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute no court had attempted to
define what impact, if any, this definition had on the standard setting authority
accorded to the Secretary elsewhere in the Act. In construing similar language
in statutes that confer rulemaking power on other administrative agencies,
however, the Court has accorded to the agency broad discretion to determine
the means that are necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose. For example,
in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, inc." the Court considered the Federal
Reserve Board's authority to issue regulations that are "necessary and
proper" to effectuate the Truth in Lending Act. 5° In that case, the Board had
issued a regulation that, while regulating conduct not specifically addressed by
the statute, was intended to prevent circumvention of the statute's purposes. 5 '
The Court read the "necessary and proper" language in the statute as requir-
ing the regulations issued by the Board to be reasonably related to the statute's
purposes. 52 Using this standard, the Court upheld the regulation in question
since it was a reasonable means of achieving the purposes of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act."
Statutory language authorizing an agency to issue regulations that are
"necessary and appropriate" has been construed by the Court to have much
the same meaning. In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 54 the Court reviewed the
decision of the Federal Power Commission to set maximum rates for the sale of
natural gas on an area-wide basis." The Natural Gas Act" directs the FPC to
set reasonable rates57 and to issue rules, orders, and regulations "necessary or
appropriate" to achieve that purpose." Several producers of natural gas,
noting that the statute provides for the regulation of rates set by individual
49 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
'`) 15 U.S.C.	 1604 (1976).
51
 The Truth in Lending Act requires merchants who extend credit to their customers
to make certain disclosures including the amount and rate of finance charges. 15 U.S.C. 5 1631
(1976). The Federal Reserve Board issued a regulation that included not only situations involv-
ing credit, but also transactions where payment is made in more than four installments, the
assumption being that such transactions often include a hidden finance charge. 12 C.F.R.
226.2(k) (1972).
52 Mourning, 411 U.S. at 369. Accord, FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978). In National Citizens Committee the Court stated that the FCC's authority,
under the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 5 303 (1976), to issue regulations "necessary to carry
out the provisions of the Act," requires only that its regulations not be an unreasonable means of
achieving the purposes of the Act. Id. at 796.
" Mourning, 411 U.S. at 371.
" 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
" Id, at 754.
56 15 U.S.C. 5 717 (1976).
" Sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the National Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. 55 717c(a), d(a)
(1976)
58 15 U.S.C. 5 717(o) (1976).
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companies, argued that area-wide rates were not authorized by the statute."
The Supreme Court upheld the FPC's regulations setting area-wide rates, find-
ing that the Commission had exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner. 6°
In so doing, the Court noted that the "necessary or appropriate" language on-
ly required the FPC to issue regulations that were reasonably related to the
statute's purposes, 6 ' thereby allowing the FPC broad discretion to choose the
appropriate means to achieve those purposes. In view of this result and the
result in Mourning, it seems that section 3(8) grants to OSHA broad discretion
similar to that provided the FPC and the Federal Reserve Board. Such discre-
tion would make an OSHA standard consistent with section 3(8) if a
reasonable relationship between the standard and the purpose of the OSH Act
could be established.
The legislative history of section 3(8) fails to give any indication that the
phrase should be given a more restrictive meaning. The provision was identical
in all versions of the bill, suggesting that there was no dispute over this
language." It also should be emphasized that the phrase appears in the defini-
tion of an OSHA standard, rather than in the rule-making provisions as was
the case in Mourning and Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. This placement further
weakens any suggestion that Congress intended to structure the statute so that
the phrase would have a more restrictive effect on the standard setting authori-
ty granted by the statute than the language interpreted by the Court in the
above cases. Thus, it would seem that the phrase grants to the Secretary of
Labor broad discretion to choose the means necessary to carry out the purposes
of the OSH Act.
B. The OSH Act's Criteria for Selecting a Permanent Standard
for Toxic Substances: Construing Section 6(b)(5)
The parameters of the Secretary's authority to choose a permanent stand-
ard are further defined in section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act." This section im-
poses essentially three requirements on the Secretary when promulgating a
permanent OSHA standard. First, it directs the Secretary to choose a standard
that prevents "material impairment of health or functional capacity. " 64 The
courts have not had occasion to decide what constitutes "material" impair-
ment of health. The legislative history indicates, however, that the word
"material" was inserted to prevent the Secretary from attempting to regulate
" 390 U.S. at 774.
Id. at 828.
61 The opinion stated: "This court has repeatedly held that the width of administrative
authority must be measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred." 390 U.S. at
776. (citations omitted).
62 The language was mentioned only briefly in committee reports and was identical in
the House and Senate versions of the bill. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT OF
1970 166, 832, 1156 (Comm. Print 1971). [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
63 29 U.S.C. S 655(b)(5) (1976). See note 24 supra.
66 Id.
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negligible hazards. 65
 Second, the Secretary is required to act on the basis of
"the best available evidence." 66 This phrase allows the Secretary to act in cir-
cumstances where the scientific knowledge is conflicting or uncertain. 67
 The
courts of appeal have construed this language to impose a duty on the Secretary
to act even though the facts in dispute are on "the frontier of scientific
knowledge" and existing methodology or research is deficient." Third, section
6(b)(5) directs the Secretary to choose standards that prevent material impair-
ment of health "to the extent feasible."" The appeals courts have construed
this feasibility requirement to include both economic and technological
feasibility. As for technological feasibility, these courts have allowed the
Secretary to set OSHA standards which go beyond the status quo and force im-
provements in existing technology. 70 However, the courts of appeal have split
on the issue of how to define economic feasibility. While some courts have
allowed the Secretary to exercise broad discretion in determining what is
economically feasible, other courts have required the Secretary to find that the
economic costs of a standard are justified by the benefit provided.
The broad discretion view is held by the District of Columbia and Third
Circuits. In Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson," the D.C. Circuit con-
sidered whether the Secretary had acted improperly in considering the
economic impact on an industry of setting an OSHA standard for asbestos. 72
In upholding the Secretary's decision to take into account economic impact,
the court noted that a standard that is "prohibitively expensive is not
65
 The language in the initial Senate Committee bill read "any impairment of health."
(emphasis added) S. REP. No. 2193, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 40; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 68, at 242. Senator Dominic of Colorado proposed an amendment to delete this portion of
5 6(b)(5) in which he noted that:
This requirement is inherently confusing and unrealistic. It could be read to
require the Secretary to ban all occupations in which there remains some risk of in-
jury, impaired health, or life expectancy. In the case of all occupations, it will be
impossible to eliminate all risks to safety and health. Thus, the present criteria
could, if literally applied, close every business in this nation. In addition, in many
cases, the standard which might most "adequately" and "feasibly" assure the
elimination of the danger would be the prohibition of the occupation itself.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 68, at 367. Eventually, after conferring with the bill's spon-
sors, Senator Dominic offered a substitute amendment that replaced the word "any" with
"material." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 62, at 503.
66 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) (1976). See note 24 SOM.
67 See, e.g., Soc'y of the Plastic Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Indus. Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 476
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
68 Id.
69 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5). See note 24 supra.
7° In Soc'y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309, (2d Cir.) an. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975), the appeals court stated: "Nile Secretary is not restricted by the status quo.
He may raise standards which require improvements in existing technologies or which require
the development of new technology, and he is not limited to issuing standards based solely on
devices already fully developed." (citations omitted). See also AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d
109 (3d Cir. 1975) (The OSH Act is technology-forcing).
" 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (reviewing an OSHA asbestos standard).
" Id.
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feasible."" the court further noted that the Secretary may consider how the
cost will affect individual employers and change the competitive structure of
the industry as a whole, 74 but stopped short of requiring the Secretary to do so.
In AFL-CIO v. Brennan" the Third Circuit faced the same issue in review-
ing the OSHA decision to issue a new standard setting less stringent regula-
tions on the safety of power press operations" because the existing standard
was not economically feasible. The court noted that the Secretary could set a
standard that would put marginally efficient businesses out of business," but
it added that the Secretary did not have authority to establish a standard that
would result in massive economic dislocation in an industry.'" Accordingly, the
court concluded that the economic costs could be considered in setting a stand-
ard.
More recently, in American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA," the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed this view of economic feasibility. Industry representatives had
provided data indicating that the economic impact of OSHA's coke emissions
standard would be severe. 80 The court reasoned, however, that the evidence
fell short of demonstrating the "massive dislocation which could characterize
an economically infeasible standard." 8 ' Moreover, the court noted that the
Secretary, while not quantifying the likely benefits, had found the substantial
costs to be justified in light of the hazards involved. 82 The court concluded,
therefore, that the Secretary had given proper consideration to economic
feasibility. 83 Thus, prior to the Fifth Circuit Court's review of the benzene stand-
ard in American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA," the D.C. and Third Circuit Courts
had determined that widespread economic dislocation in an industry would
" Id. at 477.
" Id. at 478. The court noted that economic feasibility does not "guarantee the con-
tinued existence of individual employers," and that "if the competitive structure of the industry
would be otherwise adversely affected — perhaps rendered unable to compete with imports or
with substitute products — the Secretary could properly consider that factor." Id.
" 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
76 Id.
" Id. at 123. The court remarked, "Congress did contemplate that the Secretary's
rulemaking would put out ofbusiness some businesses so marginally efficient or productive as to
be unable to follow standards otherwise universally feasible." Id.
78 The court stated, "We will not impute to congressional silence a direction to the
Secretary to disregard the possibility of massive economic dislocation caused by an unreasonable
standard." Id.
28 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (OSHA coke oven emissions standard).
" Id. at 836.
" Id. (citation omitted).
82 Id. The court quoted from the Secretary's findings as follows:
[A]lthough we cannot rationally quantify the benefit of the standard, careful con-
sideration has been,-given to the question of whether these substantial costs are
justifiable in light of the hazards. OSHA concludes that these costs are necessary
in order to adequately protect employees from the hazards associated with coke
oven emissions.
Id. (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 46751 (1976)).
a' Id. at 836-37.
" 501 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
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make an OSHA standard economically infeasible, while the economic failure
of a few marginally efficient firms would not. 85 No court had read economic
feasibility as a requirement that the Secretary should subject OSHA standards
to cost-benefit analysis.
In its review of the benzene standard, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that economic feasibility required consideration of both the costs and
benefits that could be expected to result from an OSHA standard." In a
previous decision," the Fifth Circuit had held that the Consumer Product Safe-
ty Act88 required the Consumer Product Safety Commission to rely on cost-
benefit analysis in determining the need for its standards." The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the purpose of the OSH Act was sufficiently similar to give it an
analogous reading. 9° Thus, the court concluded that there must be a reason-
able relationship between the expected costs and benefits for an OSHA stand-
ard to be valid." With regard to the benzene standard, the court noted that
OSHA's failure to quantify the expected benefits of that standard made it im-
possible to assess whether its benefits were reasonably related to its costs. 92 Ac-
cordingly, the court held the standard to be invalid. 93
After the Fifth Circuit's decision in the benzene case, the Sixth Circuit
also held that the OSH Act required the Secretary to weigh costs and benefits
in setting standards. In RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 94 the Sixth Circuit
remanded for further proceedings an enforcement action brought against RMI
Co. for a violation of an OSHA noise control standard. The court took this ac-
tion because the Secretary had failed to determine the economic feasibility of
that standard. 95 The court asserted that a standard was not necessarily feasible
merely because it was easily affordable." Instead, it held that the benefits of a
standard must be weighed against its costs." While declining to suggest exactly
85 See text and notes at notes 72-77 supra.
86 Id. at 503.
" Acqua Slide n' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th
Cir. 1978).
88 Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2051.
89 569 F.2d at 844.
9° 581 F.2d at 502. The Consumer Product Safety Act directed the commission to set
standards "reasonably necessary to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm." 15 U.S.C. S
2058(c)(2)(A) (1976). The Fifth Circuit read the "reasonably necessary or appropriate"
language in 5 3(8) of the OSH Act in conjunction with the provision in S 6(b)(5) directing the
Secretary to set standards that prevent material harm "to the extent feasible," and concluded
that the OSH Act and the Consumer Product Safety Act had "precisely similar requirements"
which called for cost-benefit analysis of standards. Id. at 502.
91
 Id. at 503.
92 Id. at 505.
93 Id.
94 594 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1979).
95 Id. at 573. Enforcement proceedings for violations of OSHA standards are brought
before the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commission., 29 U.S.C. S 659(c) (1976).
The court, therefore, remanded the case to that body for further proceedings.
96
 594 F.2d at 573.
97 id.
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how costs and benefits are to be weighed, the court noted that such an analysis
is essential in determining whether an OSHA standard is feasible."
The Sixth Circuit's decision left the courts of appeal evenly divided on the
issue of how the OSH Act directs the Secretary to consider the economic
feasibility of an OSHA standard. The D.C. and Third Circuits, choosing
widespread economic dislocation in an industry as the characteristic indicating
infeasibility, would allow the Secretary to set standards that drove marginally
efficient employers out of business. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits, reasoning
that a standard is not feasible if its costs are disproportionate to its benefits, re-
quired the Secretary to use cost-benefit analysis to determine feasibility.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION: INDUSTRIAL UNION
DEPARTMENT V. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
A. The Plurality Opinion
In Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute99 the
Supreme Court faced the question whether the Secretary had exceeded his
authority under the OSH Act in setting a standard that limited benzene ex-
posure to the lowest level technologically and economically achievable without
widespread harm to the affected industries. The Secretary's decision to set the
benzene standard at that level was a product of several determinations. First,
because of the absence of evidence clearly indicating that long-term exposure to
benzene in any quantity was risk-free, the Secretary determined that the ex-
posure level should be set at the lowest level feasible. 10° Then, taking a liberal
reading of the feasibility restriction in section 6(b)(5), he determined that the 1
ppm standard was feasible since it could be achieved without widespread harm
to the affected industries."' Thus, in reviewing the benzene standard, the
Supreme Court was presented with the question whether the Secretary had erred
by exceeding his authority under the OSH Act when he set the benzene stand-
ard in this fashion.
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, shared the Fifth
Circuit's view that the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language in the
Act's definition of an OSH standard imposed some restrictions on the
Secretary's authority to set standards. 102 For a standard to fall within this
93 Id. The court held that the Secretary had the burden of proving feasibility and added,
In order to justify the expenditure, there must be a reasonable assurance that there
will be an appreciable and corresponding improvement in working conditions.
The determination of how the cost-benefit balance tips in any given case must
necessarily be made on an ad hoc basis. We do not today prescribe any rigid for-
mula for conducting such analysis.
Id.
99 100 S.Ct. 2844 (1980).
100
 43 Fed. Reg. at 5932 (1978).
101 43 Fed. Reg. at 5939 (1978).
102 100 S.Ct. at 3850.
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definition, justice Stevens concluded, the Secretary must first find that there is
a significant risk of material health impairment that the standard will
address.'°3
 Without such a threshold finding, Stevens argued, a standard could
not be characterized as reasonably necessary or appropriate to effecivate the
Act's purposes. 104
Although the Secretary had found that benzene causes cancer, he had not
found that workers were exposed to a significant risk of such harm at the cur-
rently permissible exposure level. The plurality, therefore, upheld the lower
court's decision to invalidate the new, more restrictive standard without deter-
mining whether the Fifth Circuit was correct in holding that the OSH Act also
required the Secretary to engage in cost-benefit analysis of OSHA standards to
determine their economic feasibility. 105
In determining that the Secretary had failed to find a significant risk under
the former 10 ppm standard, Stevens reviewed the rationale and procedure in-
volved in the decision to issue the new 1 ppm standard. He stated that the
evidence linking benzene exposure to cancer, on which the Secretary had
relied, did demonstrate a linkage, but at exposure levels far above the current
permissible level of 10 ppm.106 While
 recognizing that estimating the harm that
will result from low levels of exposure to benzene is a highly speculative
matter,I°7
 Stevens argued that OSHA, by assuming that any exposure to
benzene is unacceptable, had placed upon those opposing the proposed stand-
ard the impossible burden of proving that a safe level of exposure existed. i° 8 He
noted that, in setting the 1 ppm benzene standard, OSHA had applied its
policy for regulating carcinogens having no proven safe exposure level. '° 9 That
policy was to set a standard at the lowest feasible level."° Reflecting on this
10 ' Id. The court held,
We agree with the Fifth Circuit's holding that § 3(8) requires the Secretary to find,
as a threshold matter, that the toxic substance in question poses a significant health
risk in the workplace and that a new, lower standard is therefore 'reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment," Id.
104 Id.
1 °' Id.
10 ' Id. at 2854. Although OSHA originally had believed that the exposure level in one of
the studies was between zero and 15 ppm., the authors of that study later admitted that the ex-
posure levels were, in fact, much higher, perhaps as much as 1000 ppm. Id. at 2854 n.16. In its
explanation of the benzene standard OSHA stated: " [i]t is impossible to derive any conclusions
regarding dose-response relationships for benzene." 43 Fed. Reg. at 5946 (1978).
1 " Individual susceptibility to harm from carcinogens varies greatly. Moreover, because
of the lack of data regarding long-term exposure to low doses of such substances it is often im-
possible to construct a reliable dose-response curve to predict the harm that will occur at any
given level of exposure. In such cases, it is also impossible to determine a safe level. See McGari-
ty, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L." 729, 733-36. (1979). [hereinafter cited as McGarity].
106 100 S.Ct. at 2861 n.39.
109 100 S.Ct. at 2861.
10 Id. at 2861. OSHA has adopted a "generic" policy to guide its regulation of all car-
cinogens. Under this policy the exposure limit for a substance with no proven safe dose level
would be set at the lowest level feasible. 45 Fed. Reg. 5219-20 (1980). The policy formally took
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standard-setting process, Stevens asserted that OSHA, by assuming that no
safe exposure level existed, had evaded its burden of determining that a signifi-
cant risk was posed by exposure under the current standard."'
Indeed, Stevens argued that OSHA's reading of the Act ignored the need
to consider risk."' He noted that OSHA regarded the "reasonably necessary
or appropriate" phrase in section 3(8) as merely requiring its standards to be
reasonably expected to improve safety in the work environment.'" Stevens ob-
jected to this broad construction of the statute's purposes and argued that such
a reading implied that the Act's purpose was to produce absolute safety." 4 In-
stead, Stevens believed that the Act was intended to eliminate only significant
risks of harm, not to require that the workplace be risk-free,'" and he cited
legislative history to support this claim. In particular, Justice Stevens discussed
the Senate Committee's decision to limit the scope of the Act's coverage to
"material impairment of health" rather than "any impairment of health. ,,116
He argued that this change indicated Congress's desire to avoid regulation of
not only trivial types of harm, but also insignificant risks of harm." 7
Stevens also pointed to other provisions in the Act that indicate that its
purpose is not to eliminate all risks of harm. In particular, he noted that the Act
allows the Secretary to set standards for "toxic chemicals" and "harmful
physical agents" rather than for substances in general." 8 In addition, he
pointed to the requirement of grave risk contained in the provision regarding
emergency temporary standards as proof that something more than speculation
about possible harm is required before the Secretary can set standards." 9
Finally, he noted that OSHA's reading of the statute would give the Secretary
authority to regulate all substances and conditions in the work environment,
even when there was no significant risk of harm.'" Such unbridled discretion,
effect on April 21, 1980, and was not in force at the time OSHA established the benzene stand-
ard. As Justice Stevens pointed out, however, OSHA took this same approach in setting the
benzene standard. 100 S.Ct. at 2861 n.39.
" 1 Id. at 2869. The very purpose of this policy view is administrative convenience.
OSHA asserts that it should not be forced to determine whether there is an acceptable exposure
level for each carcinogen on a case-by-case basis. By presuming any level of exposure to be harm-
ful, OSHA can streamline its regulatory process by concentrating its efforts on determining the
lowest level achievable. 45 Fed. Reg. 5013 (1980). See also Berger and Riskin, Economic and
Technological Feasibility under OSHA, 7 ECOL. L. Q. 285 (1978).
"I 100 S.Ct. at 2863-64.
'" Id. at 2863.
'" Id. at 2864.
113 Id.
" 6 Id at 2866-68. See note 65 supra.
117 100 S,Ct. at 2866.
'" Id. at 2864.
" 6 Id. at 2869 n.59. Justice Stevens cited the appeals court decision in Florida Peach
Growers Ass'n v. Dept. of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974), and Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Dept. of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1978), as support for the notion that the Secretary's
authority is carefully constricted by the OSH Act. Id.
120 Id. at 2866.
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he warned, could be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to
an administrative agency.'"
Stevens then explained his own reading of the statute. In his view, the
burden of proof is on OSHA to demonstrate the need for a new standard.'"
This requires the Secretary to determine that it is more likely than not" that
exposure at the current permissible level presents a significant risk of material
health impairment.'" He noted that in this case OSHA, by assuming that no
safe level existed, had failed even to attempt to meet this burden of proof. 124
Additionally, he explained that the "best available evidence" provision of the
Act does not require OSHA to support its determinations with scientific cer-
tainty.' 25 Stevens cited with approval the approaches taken by the lower courts
in allowing OSHA to rely on data that is "on the frontier of scientific
knowledge.' "25 He noted that the Secretary may use such data so long as it is
supported by "a body of reputable scientific thought. '" 27 At the same time, he
declined to comment on what specific factual findings are required to support a
finding of significant risk.' 28 He did assert, however, that risk must be "quan-
tified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an
understandable way.'" 29 Stevens also indicated that, in issuing other stand-
ards, OSHA has demonstrated that it is able to determine the magnitude of a
risk by a variety of methods.' 3°
Stevens thus read the language and legislative history of the OSH Act as
requiring only the elimination of significant risks, not the achievement of ab-
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2869.
123
124 Id. at 2870.
122 Id. at 2871.
128 Id. (citing Indus. Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974)); Soc'y of
The Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir 1975). See note 70 supra.
12? 100 S.Ct. at 2871.
128 Id. at 2872.
m Id. at 2866.
130
 Id. at 2871. Stevens noted with approval the techniques used by OSHA to estimate
the risks involved in exposure to coke oven emissions in Am. Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577
F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). The court granted certiorari in this case on the same day it decided the
Industrial Union Dept. case. Industry representatives subsequently filed motions to withdraw
their challenge to the OSHA coke oven emissions standard. [1980] 487 EMPL. SAFETY AND
HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 1.
Justice Stevens also stated that in many cases OSHA can make use of data from animal
experiments in determining whether a substance poses a significant risk at current exposure
levels. He noted that OSHA had relied on such data in setting its vinyl chloride standard and in
setting standards for other carcinogens. Id at 2872. While acknowledging that animal studies
could not be used in estimating the risk posed by exposure to benzene (because benzene has not
been found to cause cancer in animals), Stevens remarked that OSHA had failed to make use of
data from a number of epidemiological studies involving benzene exposure. Id. He added:
"Although the agency stated that this evidence was insufficient to construct a precise correlation
between exposure levels and cancer risks, it would at least be helpful in determining whether it is
more likely than not that there is a significant risk at 10 ppm." Id. at n.64.
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solute safety. For this reason, he asserted that the Secretary must find it more
likely than not that there is a significant risk at the current exposure level before
he is with authority to set a more stringent standard. 13 ' He also made it clear
that the Secretary's finding of risk need not be supported by scientific certainty
since section 6(b)(5) expressly directs him to act on the "best available
evidence."'" Stevens strongly objected, however, to the Secretary's reliance
on the mere assumption that any exposure to benzene poses a significant risk in
setting the 1 ppm benzene standard.' 33 He concluded that the failure to find
that a significant risk was probably present under the prior 10 ppm standard
rendered the new standard invalid. 134
B. The Concurring Opinions
There were three concurring opinions in this case, written by Chief Justice
Burger,'" Justice Powell' 36
 and Justice Rehnquist.' 37
 Each took a different
view of the Secretary's authority to set standards. Chief Justice Burger, agree-
ing entirely with the plurality's reasoning, emphasized the differing functions
of the courts and administrative agencies and argued that courts should
carefully avoid substantive revision of agency policy while keeping the agency
within the limits of its statutory authority.'" In his concurring opinion, Justice
Powell also agreed with the plurality's reasoning insofar as it required the
Secretary to find a significant risk.'" Powell argued, however, that the statute
also requires the Secretary to find that the benefits of a standard bear a
reasonable relationship to their cost.'" Justice Rehnquist, concurring only in
the Court's judgment, argued that section 6(b)(5) does not imposed adequate
limits on the Secretary's authority to set standards and that it, therefore, con-
stitutes an invalid delegation of legislative authority."'
Chief Justice Burger, in his opinion, reinforced the plurality's view of the
Secretary's obligation to find a significant risk before he sets a standard."' He
also agreed that the risk must be "sufficiently quantified to characterize it as
significant in an understandable way. "143
 The Chief Justice distinguished be-
tween the proper roles of administrative agencies and the courts in the rule-
making process, and emphatically disclaimed the notion that the court was
engaging in revision of agency policy by means of the significant risk require-
ment.'" In his view, determining whether a risk is significant is a decision for
' 3 ' Id. at 2850.
"2 See text and notes at notes 125-27, supra.
144
 See text and notes at notes 106-11, supra.
134
 100 S.Ct. at 2850.
'" Id. at 2874 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
136 Id. at 2875 (Powell, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 2878 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
CU Id. at 2874-75.
' 34 Id. at 2875.
' 4° Id. at 2877-78.
141 Id. at 2886.
132 Id. at 2874. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
143 Id.: see
 text
 at note 129 supra.
144 Id. at 2875.
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the Secretary to make, while the court's role is to ensure that the Secretary acts
within the limits of his statutory authority.' 45
 At the same time, the Chief
Justice took issue with the view that the Secretary has a statutory obligation to
remedy all risks of harm. He argued that the Secretary had both the respon-
sibility and the authority to refrain from the use of extravagant regulatory
schemes to remedy minimal risks. 146
 Like the plurality, Chief Justice Burger
avoided the question whether cost-benefit analysis is required, by setting aside
the benzene standard on the grounds that the Secretary had failed to make the
threshold finding of significant risk."'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell differed from the plurality's
reasoning in two important respects. First, he argued that the Secretary had
come close to carrying his burden of proof on the issue of significant risk.'" Sec-
ond, he addressed the cost-benefit issue and concluded that the OSH Act re-
quires the Secretary to find a reasonable relationship between a standard's
costs and benefits. 149
 On the issue of whether the Secretary had found a signifi-
cant risk at the current exposure level, Powell argued that the Secretary had
not relied solely on a carcinogen policy in adopting the new standard. Instead,
he noted that OSHA had provided specific findings to support its determina-
tion that the substantial costs of the standard were justified in light of the
hazard it was intended to alleviate."° Powell contended that this determination
would itself amply demonstrate the existence of a significant risk."' Powell,
however, argued that such an approximation of the risk's magnitude would on-
ly be adequate in cases where the best available evidence indicated that quan-
tification of risk was impossible. 152
 Thus, he reduced the issue of significant risk
in this case to two questions. Does substantial evidence in the record support
the claim that the risk cannot be quantified? 153
 If so, then, does substantial
evidence in the record support the finding that the risks are significant? 154
Without noting his reasons, Powell concluded that OSHA had failed to carry
its burden of proof on the threshold requirement." 5
145 Id. Chief Justice Burger noted: "When the facts and arguments have been presented
and duly considered, the Secretary must make a policy judgment as to whether a specific risk of
health impairment is significant in terms of the policy objectives of the statute." Id.
' 4 ' Id. The Chief Justice summed up this point with the following caveat: "Perfect safety
is a chimera; regulation must not strangle human activity in the search for the impossible." Id.
' 4" Id. at 2874.
"8 Id. at 2877.
149 Id. On this point Justice Powell took a position quite similar to that held by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. "An occupational health standard is neither 'reasonably necessary'
nor 'feasible' if it calls for expenditures wholly disproportionate to the expected health and safety
benefits." Id.; compare Am. Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503.
ISO Id. at 2876. (Powell, J., concurring). This is the same agency finding relied upon by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in determining that the Secretary properly had considered
economic feasibility in Am. Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA. See note 82 supra.
15' 100 S.Ct. at 2876.
152 Id,
I" Id. at 2876-77.
1 " Id. at 2877.
155 id.
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Powell, however, went on to the question whether the Act required cost-
benefit analysis of OSHA standards. Powell stated that a standard was not
"reasonably necessary" or "feasible" unless its benefits were reasonably related
to its cost. 156 Any approach that failed to restrict the Secretary's authority in
this fashion, Powell argued, would result in a serious misallocation of resources
devoted to employee health and safety.' 57 Accordingly, Powell concluded that
the OSH Act required cost-benefit analysis, including an explanation of the
method used to balance economic cost to the industry against the value of the
standard's health and safety benefits.'"
Justice Rehnquist joined in the court's judgment, but rejected entirely the
plurality's reasoning. Instead, Rehnquist contended that, in fashioning the
structure of the OSH Act, Congress failed to provide adequate guidelines to
direct the Secretary in setting standards. 159 In particular, he focused on the
language of section 6(b)(5), which requires the Secretary to set a standard that
assures employee safety "to the extent feasible. „160 Rehnquist noted that
neither the Act nor its legislative history clarified how the Secretary should
determine what is "feasible." 16 ' In fact, Rehnquist asserted that Congress
chose to avoid this difficult legislative decision by delegating it to the
Secretary. 162 He concluded that this rendered invalid the first sentence of sec-
tion 6(b)(5), which authorizes the Secretary to set "feasible” standards, as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agen-
cy. 169 For this reason, Rehnquist found the benzene standard invalid and
would invalidate the first sentence of section 6(b)(5) as it applies to toxic
substances for which no safe level of exposure is known.'" He noted that this
solution would eliminate the criteria of feasibility. Thus, in Rehnquist's view,
the Secretary would be forced to set standards which are absolutely safe or
none at all. 165
C. The Dissenting Opinion
The four dissenting justices, in an opinion written by Justice Marshall,
also dismissed the plurality's significant risk requirement as a fabrication
unrelated to the Act or its legislative history. 166 Instead, Marshall contended
that the OSH Act's purpose was to improve the health and safety of American
"6 Id.
' 57 Id. at 2878.
"8 Id.
159 Id. at 2879. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
16D Id. at 2878-79.
HI Id. at 2883. Justice Rehnquist remarked that "the feasibility requirement, as
employed in S 6(b)(5) is a legislative mirage . . . assuming any form desired by the beholder."
Id.
162 Id. at 2885.
163 Id. at 2886.
164 Id. at 2887.
165 Id.
' 66 Id. at 2897. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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workers' 67 and that section 3(8) should be read to allow the Secretary to set any
standard that could be reasonably expected to achieve that purpose.'" Mar-
shall asserted, therefore, that the benzene standard should be upheld so long as
the Secretary has acted reasonably and in compliance with the procedure set
forth in the Act.' 69
 Noting that OSHA had found that benzene causes cancer,
that the existing standard involved more risk than the lower standard, and that
benefits would result from the lower standard,"° Marshall argued that these
findings indicated the reasonableness of the decision to set a new standard."'
He then addressed the question whether the Secretary had fully complied with
the statute's procedural requirements. Marshall noted that section 6(b)(5)
authorized the Secretary to set the most protective standard feasible.'" Con-
curring in OSHA's reading of the feasibility requirement, he argued that the
term "feasible" should be given its ordinary meaning of achievable.'" Since
the proposed benzene standard was both technologically and economically
achievable without widespread harm to the industry, Marshall considered it
feasible. 174 Thus, he concluded that the Secretary had acted wholly within his
statutory authority in setting the standard.'"
III. THE COURT'S DECISION TO REQUIRE A THRESHOLD
FINDING OF SIGNIFICANT RISK
A. The Relationship between the OSH Acts's Purposes
and its Definition of an OSHA Standard
The Court's use of the language "reasonably necessary or appropriate,"
in section 3(8) of the OSH Act, to restrict the Secretary of Labor's authority to
set OSHA standards can be reconciled with its interpretation of similar
language in prior eases.'" In those cases the Court required that the agency's
regulations be reasonably related to the statutory purposes.' 77 In Mourning,' 78
for example, the Court held that a regulation that is a reasonable means of ac-
complishing the statutory purpose is not necessarily invalid simply because it is
not specifically called for in that statute.'" In Industrial Union Department AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, however, the Court determined that by pro-
167 Id. at 2889.
L68 Id. at 2897.
' 69 Id. at 2896.
"° Id. at 2887-88.
17 ' Id. at 2888, 2896.
172 Id. at 2889-90.
'" Id. at 2902-03.
17 ' Id. at 2902-03.
1 " Id. at 2888, 2904.
'" FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Permian Basis Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747 (1968).
177 Id. See text and notes at notes 47-62 supra.
'" Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
179 Id. at 373.
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mulgating the benzene standard the Secretary had exceeded the OSH Act's
statutory purpose because he had failed to identify a relationship between the
selection of a lower standard and the reduction of significant risk.'" The em-
phasis in the benzene case, then, was upon the relationship between the regula-
tion and the statutory purpose. Thus, a court may sustain a regulation that
falls outside the explicit language of the statute, if it serves a statutory purpose,
but a court will not sustain a regulation that has not been shown to be related to
that purpose.
This reading of section 3(8) adds importance to the Court's view of the
OSH Act's purposes. Citing the requirement of "material" harm in section
6(b)(5)'" and other provisions'" of the OSH Act as evidence of a clear con-
gressional intent to avoid a bill that would attempt to create a risk-free work en-
vironment,'" the Court determined that the Act requires some degree of risk to
be tolerated.'" The Court reasoned that these provisions restricted the scope of
the OSH Act's purposes to the reduction of significant risks; 186 when such a
risk is not present the Secretary is not empowered to set an OSHA standard." 6
B. The Likely Impact of the Requirement of Significant Risk
It is difficult to determine how well the threshold requirement of signifi-
cant risk actually serves its purpose of keeping the Secretary within his
statutory authority while not impinging on his ability to reduce serious
hazards. Much of this difficulty stems from the Court's decision to leave the re-
quirement somewhat flexible by refusing to specify how a significant risk must
be demonstrated.'" Nevertheless, by focusing on the Court's reasons for adopt-
ing this requirement, it is possible to estimate in a general way how OSHA's
standard-setting activities are likely to be affected.
First, the threshold requirement of significant risk makes it clear that the
Secretary's authority to set OSHA standards is limited not only by the nature
of the harm threatened, but also by the probability of its occurrence. 188 In addi-
tion to finding "material" harm, the Secretary must now also find that the prob-
ability of such harm is "significant." This undoubtedly will impede OSHA's
efforts to establish strict standards in instances where there is little or no
"° 100 S.Ct. at 2863.
181 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) (1976). See note 24 supra.
282 See text at notes 117 & 121 supra.
288 100 S.Ct. at 2866-2868; see also note 65 supra.
ia* Id. at 2864.
to' Id.
288 Id. The Court summarized the Secretary's duty by stating: "[B]efore he can pro-
mulgate any permanent health or safety standard, the Secretary is required to make a threshold
finding that a place of employment is unsafe — in the sense that significant risks are present and
can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices." Id.
"? See text and notes at notes 127-30 supra.
288 The plurality's discussion emphasized the fact that many ordinary activities involve
risks of material harm which cannot be characterized as "unsafe" because the possibility of harm
is so remote. 100 S.Ct. at 2864.
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evidence that the current standard will result in harm to employees. To this ex-
tent, the significant risk requirement apparently distinguishes between a
demonstrable or actual risk of harm and mere speculation that such harm may
occur.' 89
Thus, the threshold requirement of significant risk is an attempt to keep
OSHA from avoiding its burden of proof in showing the need for a standard.' 9°
Quite clearly, the Court viewed with hostility OSHA's decision to base its
justification on policy arguments rather than facts.' 9 ' The Court may well have
seen OSHA's procedure as a threat to the statutory requirement that the
Secretary's findings be supported by substantial evidence."'
The Court's decision also ought to dampen the enthusiasm with which
OSHA has been viewing the use of policy judgments, as a substitute for the
need to rely on facts, in determining the appropriate standard for each toxic
substance it regulates.'" These policy judgments would be embodied in
categorical or "generic" standards.'" The purpose of such generic standards is
to allow OSHA to establish in one rulemaking proceeding a single standard
that could be applied to an entire category of toxic substances, thereby
eliminating the need to set standards on a case-by-case basis.'" While the
Court did not suggest that OSHA may not use a generic policy to prove an
identical fact regarding a group of related materials,' 96 the Court's approach
implicitly rejects the use of such policies in instances where the agency lacks the
data necessary to support a determination of significant risk as required by the
Act."' For this reason, OSHA should avoid reliance on categorical assump-
tions concerning the lack of a safe exposure level or the probability of harm
where the data is simply insufficient to demonstrate the validity of such a claim.
At the same time, the Court's treatment of this case should not be read as
an attempt to curtail OSHA's authority to regulate in areas of scientific uncer-
1" Both the plurality opinion and the Chief justice's concurring opinion argue that the
mere possibility of harm does not justify an OSHA standard. Id. at 2869, 2875.
150 Id. at 2869.
"L Id. at 2860, 2870.
192 See text and notes at note 10 supra.
' 93 45 Fed. Reg. 5013 (1980).
194 Id.
195 45 Fed. Reg. 5013 (1980). OSHA cited "administrative feasibility" as the reason for
adopting generic policies. It argues that "the necessity to resolve basic scientific policy issues
anew, in each rulemaking, has increased the burden on the Dept. of Labor and the scientific
community.. . " Id.
"s The plurality does not address the issue of how such generic policies may be used to
set standards. Justice Powell, however, notes: "[A]lthough I would not rule out the possibility
that the necessary findings could rest in part on generic policies properly adopted by OSHA, no
properly supported agency policies are before us in this case." 100 S.Ct. at 2875.
197 Id. at 2871. A lack of reliable data, while relevant to the issue of how the risk must be
quantified, does not relieve the necessity of finding a significant risk. In the words of Justice
Stevens: "[A]lthough the agency has no duty to calculate the exact probability of harm, it does
have an obligation to find that a significant risk is present before it can characterize a place as un-
safe." Id.
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tainly. The Court expressly took a liberal view of OSHA's authority to regulate
on the basis of "the best available evidence," declaring that it will allow
OSHA to act when the available data is conflicting and uncertain.'" In prior
cases involving this problem OSHA had relied on expert testimony to support
its interpretation of the data. 199 The Court's decision clearly endorses this use
of expert testimony. 200 Similarly, the Court took a liberal view of the need to
quantify risk."' The Court seems interested primarily in having the agency
consider all the available data and make its best estimation of the magnitude of
the risk involved before it decides to act. 202 This approach suggests that when
the risk can be quantified, OSHA should do so, and the Secretary should then
rely on this estimate of harm to determine whether a significant risk is present.
When the available data makes exact quantification of the risk impossible, 203
however, OSHA may use the extant data to produce a range of estimates
regarding the magnitude of the risk involved. In some cases, the Secretary may
be able to determine that the range itself demonstrates that it is more likely
than not that a significant risk is present. Alternatively, where the degree of
risk is less certain, OSHA could use these estimates to rank toxic substances in
terms of their probable risk of harm. 204 This ranking would allow the Secretary
to set priorities in regulating substances based on risk, and to find that the risk
of harm posed by certain substances is, relative to other risks, significant. Since
this comparative approach involves reliance on the best evidence available to
quantify risk, it would seem to comply with the requirement that OSHA must
quantify the risk sufficiently to allow the Secretary to characterize it as signifi-
cant in an understandable way." 5
Finally, as for the fear that the threshold requirement allows a reviewing
court to substitute its own judgment of significance for that of OSHA, the opin-
ions in this case gave no indication that the Court intends to take that course.
190 See text and notes at notes 127-31 supra.
199 100 S.Ct. at 2871 n.64.
200 Id. at 2872. See note 201 infra.
201 Id. Justice Stevens characterized the situation as follows: "[S]o long as they are sup-
ported by a reputable body of thought, the agency is free to use conservative assumptions in in-
terpreting the data, risking error on the side of over-protection. . . " 100 S.Ct. at 2871.; see
also text at note 129 supra.
20 ' 100 S.Ct. at 2871 n.62 (plurality quoting from dissenting opinion at 2896). "Factual
determinations can at most define the risk in some statistical way; the judgment whether that risk
is tolerable cannot be based solely on a resolution of facts." Id.
2°' Because of a lack of scientific data regarding the long-term effects of exposure to toxic
substances at low exposure levels, it is often necessary to estimate the probable effect on health
from studies involving short-term exposure at high exposure levels. Often it is impossible to
predict the health effects of a given exposure level with precision. See Leape, Quantitative Risk
Assessment in the Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 86 (1980). See also
McGarity, note 109 supra.
204 In the summary accompanying its generic policy for carcinogens OSHA noted that
risk assessment techniques can be used to establish priorities among the carcinogens it intends to
regulate. 45 Fed. Reg. 5200-01 (1980).
201 100 S.Ct. at 2866; see text at note 129 supra.
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The Chief Justice, in particular, stressed that the court is not free to engage in
substantive revision of agency policy. 02 6 This  suggests that the Secretary's
determination of significance would be upheld as long as he or she had acted
reasonably and in accordance with the requirements of the Act."'
IV. THE UTILITY OF THE REQUIREMENT. OF SIGNIFICANT RISK
A. Depreciating the Value of a Cost-Benefit Approach
The Supreme Court's decision in this case consisted of a number of
divergent opinions and a bare judgment, which carefully avoided any deter-
mination whether the OSH Act requires OSHA to weigh the costs and benefits
of its standards. 208 Nevertheless, adoption of the plurality position, which re-
quires the Secretary of Labor to make a threshold finding of significant risk
before issuing an OSHA standard, can keep OSHA from exceeding its
statutory authority, while allowing it to protect employees from industrial
hazards in an effective manner. Successful application of this standard should
undermine support for the more controversial cost-benefit approach. Subse-
quent court decisions ought to adopt this result because the significant risk re-
quirement, in contrast to cost-benefit analysis, is consistent with the basic pur-
pose of the OSH Act, 209 and is the more practical approach to occupational
health and safety. 210
A cost-benefit requirement would broaden the meaning of economic
feasibility in Section 6(b)(5) of the Act 2 " to require the Secretary of Labor to
find that the anticipated costs of a standard are reasonable in light of its ex-
pected benefits. 212 Yet, the cost-benefit approach goes far beyond a determina-
tion of feasibility. In effect, it requires a determination of cost-effectiveness. It
is one thing to say that a standard is not feasible if it threatens the viability of
the regulated industry. 213
 It is quite another to determine that a standard,
which imposes little cost, is not feasible because it is expected to save too few
206 100 S.Ct. at 2875.
2°' The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently took this approach in United
Steelworkers of America AFL-CIO v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. August 15, 1980), in
which it lifted a March 1979 stay against the enforcement of an OSHA standard for lead ex-
posure. The Court held that the significant risk requirement was satisfied since OSHA did not
rely on categorical assumptions, but rather on evidence concerning the specific effects of lead ex-
posure at several different levels. Id. at 106. The Court held that the standard was valid because
it fell within the "zone of reasonableness" established by the evidence of a significant risk of
material harm. Id. at 129.
200 100 S.Ct. 2863. See note 38 supra.
2 °9 See note 3 supra.
21 ° See text and notes at notes 219.21 infra.
2" 29 U.S.C. $ 655(b)(5) (1976). See note 24 supra.
2 ' 2 Su Brief for Respondents at 3-4, Indus. Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. A.P.I, 100 S.Ct.
2844 (1980).
9 " This is the position taken by the D.C. and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals. See text
and notes at notes 71-85 supra.
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lives to justify that cost. 214 Neither the language of the Act, 215 nor its legislative
history, 216
 indicates that Congress intended to restrict the protections afforded
by OSHA standards by requiring them to be cost-effective.
The notion that economic cost to an industry can, or should, be weighed
against the value of its employees' health is not only foreign to the language
and purpose of the OSH Act, but it also attempts to conceal a value judgment
behind the impersonal facade of objective analysis. Health does not translate
easily into dollars, particularly when the dollars held by one party are weighed
against the health of another.'" Also, because the determination of cost-
effectiveness will have a direct prospective impact on the safety of employees, it
is distinguishable from an attempt to value the health of another made in the
context of a personal injury recovery. Simply stated, cost-benefit analysis of
individual OSHA standards involves pricing the physical well-being of healthy
employees and determining whether that well-being is worth preserving after
considering the likely impact of protective measures on the financial interests of
the industry involved. There is nothing analytically objective about such a de-
termination, and the criteria for making it are not found in the OSH Act.'"
The cost-benefit approach inevitably would raise questions as to how far
the courts are willing to go in restricting the regulatory options open to OSHA
when it is faced with a significant risk of material harm to employees. There
obviously will be difficulties in determining the value of human lives and
214 See text and notes at notes 90-98 supra.
2" Other statutes use language such as "unreasonable risk . . . taking into account the
economic, social and environmental costs" when they require cost-benefit analysis. Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2605a (1976). See Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.
5 2056(a).
216 As Justice Rehnquist noted, the legislative history does not support the notion that
the feasibility provision provides a means of weighing the costs and benefits of a standard. 100
S.Ct. at 2883. In fact, Senator Dominic's comments on $ 6(b)(5) support the notion that "feasi-
ble" was intended to be read as "achievable." See note 65 supra. The dissenting opinion by
Justice Marshall takes this same view. Id. at 2902-03.
7'r
	
problem of translating health benefits into dollars is not present when comparing
two standards, each having identical benefits but imposing different costs. Such a comparison,
however, does not determine which standard is feasible, but merely indicates which is more cost-
efficient.
218 The legislative history of the OSH Act contains ample evidence of a congressional
concern for keeping the criteria for setting standards separate from considerations of the stand-
ard's impact on an industry's profits. Senator Eagleton, for instance, expressed the view that
costs imposed by OSHA standards are "reasonable and necessary costs of doing business."
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, .supra note 62, at 1150. He added: "Whether we, as individuals, are
motivated by a simple humanity or by simple economics, we can no longer permit profits to be
dependent upon an unsafe or unhealthy worksite." Id. at 1150-51.
Consistent with the desire to prevent economic considerations from compromising ef-
forts to improve safety, an amendment attached to the OSH Act provided that businesses en-
countering hardship in their attempt to comply with OSHA standards could receive assistance
under 5 7(b) of the Small Business Act. 15 U.S.C. 5 636 (1976). See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 62, at 197, 310, 996, 1080, 1206 and 1257. See also $ 202 of the Public Works and Eco-
nomic Development Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 3142.
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various health impairments. 2 ' 9
 Beyond this, it will also be necessary to weigh
the value of lives and health preserved in the future against present economic
costs. 22° Ths matter is even further complicated by the variables involved in an
estimation of costs. Often, new technology and other efficiencies are developed
and applied when an industry is forced to comply with an OSHA standard. 22 '
Since such reductions in cost are not foreseeable before the standard is promul-
gated, it is difficult to imagine how they could be accounted for in weighing the
costs and benefits of a proposed standard.
The cost-benefit approach, therefore, is likely to be unworkable if applied
to OSHA standards. If cost-benefit analysis of individual standards is required,
the Secretary may be compelled to adopt a less effective, though less expensive,
remedy when the cost-effectiveness of a more ambitious approach cannot be
determined. In the worst case, the Secretary may be deterred from acting
altogether when faced with a serious health hazard but only a speculative or
very expensive way of attempting to control it. In passing the OSH Act Con-
gress sought to minimize the ways in which cost could compromise employee
safety. 222
 Any attempt to balance an employer's cost against its employees'
safety is clearly incompatible with that congressional purpose.
B. Significant Risk and the OSH Act's Pragmatic Structure
In contrast to the cost-benefit approach, the threshold requirement of
significant risk is consistent with the OSH Act's purpose of achieving, insofar
as possible, a safe working environment for every American employee. 223 At
the same time, it can prevent costly regulatory intrusions into industrial ac-
tivities that involve minimal risks. The threshold requirement essentially forces
the Secretary to consider whether a substance in the work environment, at cur-
rently permissible exposure levels, is likely to pose a significant threat to
employee safety. When there is a significant risk of material harm, the
Secretary is empowered to set an OSHA standard. When the risk is not signifi-
cant, the Secretary is without authority to act.
This approach mirrors Congress's desire to structure the OSH Act so that
it achieves the greatest protection for employees, without requiring a degree of
safety that is unattainable. This congressional desire is evidenced in the Act's
2" See generally, Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1969).
220
 In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist recognized this difficulty. 100 S.Ct. at
2879.
221 Often the reductions in cost prove to be dramatic. For instance, industry represent-
atives argued that OSHA's vinyl chloride standard would result in serious economic harm. Yet,
due to the introduction of new technology, no such harm occurred. See Doniger, Federal Regula-
tions of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substance Control, 7 EMIL. L. Q.
497, 561 (1978).
222
	 note 201 .supra.
223 See note 3 supra.
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legislative history,224 and is reflected in the requirements of section 6(b)( 5)225
that the harm is "material" and that standards be "feasible." Both of these re-
quirements indicate that there are practical limitations on the government's
ability to mandate absolute safety in the work environment.
The threshold requirement is also a product of the Court's view that the
authority to set standards regulating industrial activity without regard to the
degree of risk involved goes far beyond what is needed to effectuate the OSH
Act's purpose of achieving safety in the work environment. To consider all
risks, however remote, as unacceptable, would allow virtually all industrial ac-
tivities to be characterized as unsafe. This approach, in turn, would permit the
Secretary to issue standards that have little or no appreciable impact on
employee health or safety — precisely the result Congress sought to avoid in
structuring the OSH Act. 226
For several reasons the threshold requirement of significant risk ought to
prevent many unnecessary regulations and encourage an efficient allocation of
health and safety resources.'" The presence of a significant risk would indicate
hazards in the workplace that pose a real threat to employee health and safety.
By channeling OSHA's regulatory efforts into such areas of significant risk, the
threshold requirement should ensure that those efforts are not wasted on situa-
tions where the degree of safety can only be marginally improved. This more
focused approach would result in a greater degree of health and safety for
workers. In addition, the threshold requirement would keep the burden of proof
on the agency to demonstrate the need for its standard. 228
 This should impede
any attempt to regulate on the basis of policies that simply assume the need for
stricter standards. 229 The effect, however, will not be so drastic as to cause
agency paralysis. 23° Instead, it is likely that OSHA will consider more
carefully its choice of substances to regulate, concentrating on those for which it
has ample evidence to characterize the risk as significant in a quantitative or
224 Before the language of 6(b)(5) was restricted to "material" impairment of health
Senator Dominic observed: "It is unrealistic to attempt, as this section apparently does, to estab-
lish a utopia free from any hazards. Absolute safety is an impossibility and it will only create con-
fusion in the administration of this act for the Congress to set unattainable goals." LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 62, at 480. In offering the amendment containing the final version of S
6(b)(5) Senator Dominic remarked:
What we were trying to do in the bill unfortunately, we did not have the proper
wording . was to say that when we are dealing with toxic agents or physical
agents, we ought to take such steps as are feasible and practical to provide an atmos-
phere within which a person's health or safety would not be affected. (emphasis
added).
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 62, at 502.
225 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) (1976). See note 24 supra.
226 See note 65 supra.
222 A concern for the efficient allocation of health and safety resources is generally pro-
fessed by those advocating a cost-benefit approach. See text and notes at notes 39, 148-50 supra;
see also RMI v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 1979).
228 See text at notes 122.24 supra.
229 See text at note 188 supra.
23° See note 130 supra.
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relative manner. 231 Although the need to determine the degree of risk posed by
a hazard may increase OSHA's costs in time and resources devoted to the
regulation of any given substance, 232 the reduction of expensive regulatory
schemes, directed at areas where there is little or no gain to be realized, should
result in savings that more than offset the added costs to the agency.
Since the Secretary is required to characterize the risk as significant in an
understandable way, 233 the threshold requirement will put interested parties on
notice with respect to the degree of risk that the Secretary of Labor considers
significant enough to regulate. If the Secretary proposed a regulation which,
although valid, could result in a serious misallocation of the resources available
to improve health and safety,'" a congressional response, in the form of amend-
atory legislation, is available. In passing the OSH Act, Congress placed a
premium on safety."' If a judgment is to be made now that certain health and
safety improvements are not worth their price, it should be made by Congress
and not by politically insulated agencies or courts.
CONCLUSION
The threshold requirement of significant risk adopted by the Court in In-
dustrial Union Department AFO-C10 v. American Petroleum Institute can be used to
curb the Secretary of Labor's discretion in determining the need for an OSHA
standard, while allowing him to make full use of OSHA's expertise in fashion-
ing remedies for serious industrial hazards. This requirement will force OSHA
to consider the magnitude of the risks more carefully, thereby focusing its ef-
forts on areas in which greater benefits are possible. At the same time, since
this approach does not require any form of cost-benefit analysis, the Secretary
should be free to choose the most protective remedy achievable without causing
widespread harm to the affected industry.
By emphasizing the significance of the risk rather than the cost-
effectiveness of the remedy, the threshold requirement is a more practical
means of keeping the Secretary of Labor within the limits of his statutory
authority than the cost-benefit approach. In particular, it will avoid the dif-
ficulty of placing a value on human life inherent in any effort to balance the
financial interests of an industry against the health and safety of its employees.
In so doing, it more faithfully adheres to the basic purpose of the OSH Act,
which, while not requiring absolute safety, nevertheless places the safety of
employees far above considerations of cost-effectiveness.
THOMAS P. DALE
" 1 See text and notes at notes 202-05 supra.
"3 See note 111 supra.
233 See text at note 129 supra.
"4 See note 227 supra.
"5 See note 3 supra.
